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Peatlands in Indonesia are protected by regulations that forbid the conversion of these lands 15 
into plantations. However, peat fires here have been found to be a major source of smoke that 16 
travels across national boundaries creating regional haze. Despite these regulations, more 17 
than a quarter of all Indonesian oil palm plantations are on peat. This paper argues that 18 
patronage networks within the Indonesian oil palm sector have been a major factor in the 19 
unsustainable use of peatlands there. Rampant patronage politics have made it easy for well-20 
connected companies to skirt regulations to obtain licenses for these lands. Decentralization 21 
has further encouraged this practice at the regional level, as regional elites are eager to reap 22 
the benefits of local investments. In addition, clients are able to exert their influence over 23 
state decision-making to ensure that any changes to the licensing process does not jeopardize 24 
their access to these lands. These converted lands are highly fire-prone. Furthermore, some 25 
companies have been found to use fire as a cheap way to clear the land for planting. Hence, 26 
this paper argues that transboundary haze in Southeast Asia can be traced back to the ongoing 27 
oil palm boom in Indonesia, bolstered by patronage networks. 28 
 29 
Keywords: Indonesia; peatlands; fire and haze; oil palm plantations; patronage politics; 30 
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 35 
Introduction 36 
 37 
Tropical lowland peatswamps are a major type of forestland commonly found in Southeast 38 
Asia. The Southeast Asian region is estimated to have 27 million hectares of peatlands or 6% 39 
of total peatlands in the world (Tan et al. 2009). Indonesia is fourth
 
largest in the world in 40 
terms of peatland area, being home to about 83% of the region’s peatlands, with a total of  41 
26.5 million hectares or 12% of its total land area (Tan et al. 2009). This is mostly located in 42 
large areas in between river basins in Borneo, Sumatera, and Irian Jaya (Parish 2011).  43 
 44 
The burgeoning need for land brought about by the oil palm boom in Indonesia has 45 
encouraged the conversion of peatlands to plantations. Despite its infertility for other crops, 46 
peatlands are quite suitable for the growth of oil palm when deeply drained (Tan et al. 2009). 47 
Research has shown that oil palm has a high tolerance for areas with fluctuating water tables 48 
(Liew 2010), and oil palm grown on reclaimed peatsoil has a particularly high fruit 49 
production (Ministry of Forestry 2009). By the 1980s, with most inland forests cleared, 50 
plantation companies began seeking licenses to build dykes to dry peatswamps to increase 51 
their acreage (Nowak 2008). Thus, the reclamation of peatlands increased drastically as most 52 
new oil palm plantation land was opened up on reclaimed peatswamps (Wicke et al. 2011). 53 
While the constraints discussed above make oil palm development on peat soil more 54 
expensive (with set up costs on peatlands almost double as compared to set up costs on 55 
regular mineral soil) (Liew 2010), higher oil palm trading prices have made this economically 56 
viable.  57 
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 58 
Peatlands are often attractive for oil palm plantations for several reasons. Firstly, there is 59 
often valuable timber on these lands that can be harvested and sold to provide additional 60 
funding to developers (Stone 2007). Secondly, peatlands are usually ‘empty’ in terms of 61 
communities, enabling companies to avoid conflicts with increasingly vocal and empowered 62 
local communities. Thirdly, peatlands are often located deep inside forested areas or coasts, 63 
far away from administrative centers. These secluded areas would enable plantations to 64 
conduct their activities with minimal monitoring by authorities. Fourthly, demand for 65 
peatlands are increasing with the decreasing availability of other drylands around Indonesia 66 
(Greenpeace 2007). As a result, a disproportionate and unsustainable amount of peatlands 67 
have been converted, or have been earmarked for conversion into plantations (Greenpeace 68 
2007; Silvius and Kaat 2010; Wicke et al. 2011; Kaat and Silvius 2011).  69 
 70 
Problems relating to fires and haze arise during the draining and preparing operations 71 
(Basiron 2007). Once the valuable timber is removed to be sold, the peat is usually burned to 72 
remove any remaining vegetation (Stone 2007). Burning peatlands are a fast and cheap way 73 
to clear unwanted weeds and grass in preparation for planting, and reduces the risk of pests. 74 
Therefore, one way of keeping the costs down is to clear land using fire. Maintaining low 75 
production costs is a key to the continued profitability of oil palm producers, especially since 76 
the process of draining peatlands are already costly. Although not all companies burn to clear 77 
land, satellite imagery and field observations suggest that the larger plantation groups do 78 
practice open burning on peatlands (Raman et al. 2008).  79 
 80 
Even for the companies who do not deliberately use fire, disturbance to the naturally 81 
waterlogged condition in peatlands create extremely dry conditions and hotspots (Jakarta 82 
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Post 1994). Once the peatswamp watertable is dropped for draining, it dries very quickly, 83 
making it naturally fire-prone. Fires require dry fuel,  oxygen, and a spark (Colfer 2002), and 84 
these elements are easily found on drained peatlands. Accidental fires further contribute to 85 
the drastic rate of deforestation and air pollution in Indonesia (Rukmantara 2006). As a result, 86 
research has proven that 90% of transboundary haze in the southern portion of Southeast Asia 87 
is linked to such peatland fires (Global Environment Center 2010). Drastic land conversion 88 
like this further degrades and dries out the natural landscape in such a way that future 89 
hotspots and accidental fires are liable to occur again and are likely to be more severe (Colfer 90 
2002; Greenpeace 2007; Raman et al. 2008).  91 
 92 
Indonesia actually has very clear policies on the use of peatsoil which, if properly observed, 93 
should lead to the sustainable management of peatlands and low risk of fires
1
. The puzzle 94 
here is why has this unsustainable form of land use been allowed to happen, despite these 95 
laws? This paper argues that patronage networks within the Indonesian oil palm plantation 96 
sector have been a major factor in the unsustainable use of peatlands in Indonesia. Rampant 97 
patronage politics have made it easy for well-connected plantation companies to skirt 98 
regulations to obtain licenses for these lands. Furthermore, decentralization policies have 99 
raised new tensions between the central and local governments, which have produced gray 100 
areas in the licensing process for land which are easily exploitable by patrons and clients. In 101 
addition to this, these clients are able to exert their influence over state decision-making and 102 
                                                 
1
 For example, Presidential Decree No. 32/1990, Indonesian Government Regulation No. 26/2008 states that 
peat of more than 3 meters deep should automatically be designated as protected areas (PanEco Foundation 
2008; Ministry of Forestry 2009). The Regulation of the Ministry of Agriculture No. 14/2009 stipulates that if 
there is a concession in peatlands with an area of more than 30% of its total concession having a peat 
thickness of more than 3 meters, then the entire concession should not be opened (Wibisino et al. 2011). 
Ministry of Agriculture guidelines identify areas of peat more than 76cm deep peat as unsuitable for 
conversion to agriculture (Ministry of Forestry 2009). The Ministry of Agriculture’s Instruction to the Governors 
of Indonesia No. 301/TU.210/M/12/2001 (13 December 2007) states that the issuing of new plantation 
concessions on peatlands are temporarily forbidden, pending further instructions. These policies are 
elaborated in detail in the discussion section of this paper.  
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policy-making to ensure that any statutory changes to the licensing process do not jeopardize 103 
their access to these forbidden lands.   104 
 105 
Conceptual framework  106 
 107 
This paper uses the concept of patronage politics to explain the unsustainable use of peatlands 108 
in Indonesia. Patronage politics have been a dominant characteristic of the societies in 109 
Southeast Asia and especially Indonesia (Enderwick 2005), so much so that patronage ties are 110 
a legitimate, accepted, even expected part of the economic process in the region (Dauvergne 111 
1995). Hadiz (2004, 2007) describes patronage in the Indonesian context as the system of 112 
mutually shifting and fluid coalitions of predatory networks, usually characterized by 113 
corruption and abuse of power. These predatory networks gained foothold in Indonesia 114 
primarily during Soeharto’s centralized New Order system. Through control over parliaments 115 
and political parties, and via business alliances and assorted instruments of political violence, 116 
patrons have been able to gains ascendance over state institutions and its resources (Hadiz 117 
and Robison 2005), and remain protected by authoritarian means (Hadiz 2007). This paper 118 
argues that patronage networks have encouraged the unsustainable use of fire-prone peatlands 119 
in Indonesia in two district ways. Firstly, patronage networks encourage disreputable 120 
allocations of resources. Secondly, patronage networks guide state decision-making towards 121 
the short term interests of exploiters.  122 
 123 
 Disreputable allocation of resources 124 
 125 
Patrons and clients are exclusively motivated by material gain (Kurer 1996). Indeed, one of 126 
the conditions for patronage politics to exist is that potential patrons must have access to 127 
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instrumental, economic or political resources that can be tapped for patronage purposes 128 
(Hicken 2011). In this way, patronage politics can be seen as ‘a form of domination that is 129 
used by modern political and economic elites to channel resources for their own benefit’ 130 
(Gunes-Ayata 1994: 17-26). These resources are consciously allocated by patrons to 131 
particular clients who would otherwise not have received these gains (Nesadurai 2004). 132 
Therefore, patronage politics denote a distinct mode of regulating and structuring the flow of 133 
resources in ways that differ from ‘free market’ exchange (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1995). 134 
This is why they are usually regarded as disreputable, if not illegal, by parties external to this 135 
relationship (Eisenstadt and Roniger 1995).  136 
 137 
Barr (1998), Mayer (2006), Rajenthran (2002), Richardson (2010), Aspinall (2010), 138 
McCarthy, Gillespie, and Zen (2012) have identified land licensing as a form of resource that 139 
can be tapped for patronage purposes. Barr’s (1998) early work on the shifting dynamics of 140 
control of Indonesia’s timber sector has discussed the preferential allocation of plywood 141 
licenses to members of the Indonesian Wood Panel Association (Apkindo), an association 142 
that was controlled by Bob Hasan, a well-known crony of President Soeharto.  143 
 144 
While such monopoly systems have somewhat been dismantled with the advent of 145 
decentralization in Indonesia, similar practices of preferential allocation at the central and 146 
local (district) level have continued to be observed. Hadiz  (2004) has noted that patrons have 147 
reconstituted themselves through new local alliances, and have continued to capture the 148 
institutions of Indonesia’s democracy to further their own objectives. In short, 149 
decentralization is facilitating the emergence of more localized patronage networks that are 150 
relatively autonomous of central state authority.  151 
 152 
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For example, with decentralization, regencies and districts have been empowered to 153 
administer governance of ‘capital investments’ of natural resources within their respective 154 
regions, (Rajenthran 2002) to promote regional development and encourage private 155 
companies to be committed to their investment (Richardson 2010). These newly empowered 156 
local authorities are now able to grant a plethora of new and additional types of regionally 157 
administered plantation license rights to cooperatives, individuals and companies of their 158 
choice (Mayer 2006).  159 
 160 
Work by Aspinall (2010) reflects this. He argues that Indonesia’s decentralization fostered 161 
predatory behaviour at the local level, where local parliaments became sites of corrupt deal-162 
making in which legislators colluded with officials and businesspeople to direct contracts and 163 
licenses to business allies. McCarthy, Gillespie, and Zen (2012) further focuses down this 164 
analysis to oil palm plantations at the district level. They observe that as the central 165 
government decentralized key aspects of oil palm plantation licensing to districts, district-166 
level actors gain enormous local discretionary power. With this power, local actors are able to 167 
obtain significant funds through ‘informal’ means as a result of the disreputable allocation of 168 
permits and licenses.  169 
 170 
This paper applies the arguments of these scholars to explain the preferential allocation of 171 
licenses for the development of peatlands in Indonesia. It argues that the disreputable 172 
allocation of resources by patrons to clients at both the central and local level for material 173 
gain is key to understanding how certain groups are able obtain licenses to establish oil palm 174 
plantations on peatlands, despite existing laws that explicitly forbid this. Powerful 175 
businessmen with good patronage ties have no reason to fear punishment for obtaining these 176 
illegal licenses, as the law will be disregarded for them (Kurer 1996). Indeed, such strong 177 
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patronage networks make it easy for the well-connected clients to skirt, resist, or even ignore 178 
such laws and policies (Dauvergne 1995). In this way, corrupt patronage politics foster a 179 
culture of impunity and make it difficult to punish individuals for corrupt behavior, and 180 
wrong-doing may become the norm (Kurer 1996). This creates a circle which leaves little 181 
hope in breaking the pattern of poor implementation of these policies (Dauvergne 1995).  182 
 183 
 Biased state decision-making 184 
 185 
Indeed, patronage connections often guide state decision-making (Johnston 2005), as elites 186 
are highly motivated to block, slow down, or dilute any statutory changes that imperil the 187 
informal set of connections from which they benefit (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 2004). 188 
Ascher (1998, 2000) and McCarthy (2008) have applied these understandings to their studies 189 
on Indonesia. Ascher (1998, 2000) makes the direct link between state decision-making and 190 
patronage in his writings. He explains that webs of patronage networks can result in a 191 
situation of ‘state capture’, where certain sectors mould the state and influences the policy-192 
making environment (Ascher 1998). In such environments where patronage networks 193 
complement weak government institutions, the big and the powerful tend to have 194 
disproportionate influence. The political influence of those who gain economically from 195 
exploitation activities can thwart proposals for environmental reform. The state finds itself 196 
without the autonomy or indeed the motivation to pursue policies that do not reflect the short-197 
term interests of the exploiters (Ascher 1998).  198 
 199 
Ascher (2000) uses the example of forest royalty policies during the Soeharto era to illustrate 200 
this. Despite public outcry, the Indonesian Forestry Ministry refused to review its policy on 201 
low forestry royalties that allowed private commercial loggers to retain four-fifths of timber 202 
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value, much of which should have gone to the central treasury as timber is publicly owned. 203 
Ascher argued that the Indonesian Chinese that were controlling the logging industry at the 204 
time ‘captured’ Soeharto and thus the state, as these clients were instrumental in helping to 205 
establish Indonesia’s petrochemical industry that was high on Soeharto’s priority list then 206 
(Ascher 2000). McCarthy’s (2008) more recent work on governance reform during the 207 
agrarian transition in Indonesia also reflects this. His case study of Kalimantan, Indonesia, 208 
discusses how patronage networks, or what he calls what he calls ‘networks of 209 
accommodation and exchange’ have affected decision making on resource entitlement 210 
policies in ways that benefit commercial interests. He explains that these commercial 211 
interests shape the decision-making process through private consultations with decision 212 
makers in the absence of effective transparency and accountability mechanisms (McCarthy 213 
2008). 214 
 215 
This paper in turn applies the arguments of these scholars to analyze state decision-making 216 
over the United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from 217 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD programme) in 218 
Indonesia. Under the programme, Norway pledged USD 1 billion to Indonesia in 2009 219 
(Butler et al. 2009) in exchange for a two-year moratorium on primary forests and peatlands 220 
in order to identify which parts of the Indonesian peatlands are safe for further development. 221 
However, this paper discusses how the influence of patronage networks limiting the 222 
effectiveness of the programme, as the programme has been significantly watered down due 223 
to inherent private interests. In this way, these ‘captured’ state agencies end up 224 
accommodating, assisting or even strengthening the practices that destroy natural resources 225 
(Dauvergne 1995). As these networks are very hard to suppress, and as they serve the 226 
interests of their network members, they continue to flourish (Lande 1983).  227 
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 228 
Methodology 229 
 230 
Interview methods are especially appropriate for exploring sensitive topics (Pezalla 2012), as 231 
it allows for easier expression of non-conformity (Stokes and Bergin 2006). This was 232 
particularly useful for this research topic that deals with informal institutions and personal 233 
relationships that might be considered sensitive, such as issues of patronage. Therefore, semi-234 
structured interviews were used as the primary source of data for this research.  235 
 236 
These interviews were conducted among 138 individuals that are closely linked to the 237 
Indonesian oil palm plantation sector. These included government officials, journalists, non-238 
governmental organisation (NGO) representatives, former plantation staff, and academicians 239 
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. These in-depth, semi-structured interviews were 240 
conducted over a period of six months in the year 2010, three months in 2011 and another 241 
three months in 2012. Convenience sampling was used to select interviewees; this was based 242 
on whether these individuals were willing to be interviewed when approached.  243 
 244 
Even though there was a core set of questions prepared for the interviews, common strategies 245 
like ‘branching’ (tailoring interviews to individual interests and identities) and ‘building’ 246 
(interviews that build upon earlier interviews) were employed (Gusterson 2008). The first set 247 
of questions aimed to obtain qualitative data to be used as evidence to establish the existence 248 
of the dense patronage networks that already exist between the major Indonesian oil palm 249 
plantation companies and the Indonesian government at the central and local level. Questions 250 
like “Tell me about relationship between the government and plantation firms in this area” 251 
were asked. The second set of questions focused on determining the role of patronage in the 252 
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allocation of licenses for peatlands, specifically how well-connected clients were able to 253 
receive ‘special approvals’ for the use of lands that were generally forbidden. Questions like 254 
“Was it easier for plantation companies with good relationships with the government to 255 
obtain land permits?” were asked. The third set of questions aimed to collect data to illustrate 256 
the influence of these clients in the watering-down process of the REDD programme for 257 
Indonesian peatlands to the extent that the programme was rendered ineffective. For this, 258 
questions like “How effective has the REDD programme been in protecting the peatlands of 259 
Indonesia?” were asked. These interviews were conducted as part of a larger study of the 260 
effect of patronage politics on regional level transboundary haze mitigation efforts. 261 
 262 
Discussion 263 
 264 
As a whole, this paper argues that transboundary haze in Southeast Asia can be traced back to 265 
the ongoing oil palm boom in Indonesia, bolstered by patronage networks. The discussion 266 
section of this paper is divided into three substantive sections. The first part proposes the 267 
existence of patronage networks between government and business elites within Indonesia’s 268 
oil palm sector, at the central and local level. The second and third part relates to the two 269 
factors discussed in the conceptual framework section which this paper argues have 270 
encouraged the unsustainable use of fire-prone peatlands in Indonesia. Part two discusses 271 
how licenses for the development of peatlands being preferentially allocated by central and 272 
local level elites (patrons) to well-connected groups (clients), despite existing laws. Part three 273 
then analyses how patronage networks have been instrumental in ensuring that the REDD 274 
programme remains ineffective in its attempt to restore sustainable use of Indonesia’s 275 
peatlands. 276 
  277 
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Patronage networks in the Indonesian oil palm sector  278 
 279 
In Indonesia, oil palm plantation concessionaires often cultivate patronage relationships with 280 
the ruling elite from a very early stage of their business operations (I49 personal 281 
communication 1 Dec 2011). Interviewees explain that patronage influences in the sector are 282 
especially important in obtaining licenses and property rights for the opening of plantation 283 
land, one of the earliest stages involved in the process of establishing plantations. Influential 284 
actors in the sector are often able to obtain rights to environmentally sensitive land not 285 
normally released for conversion, like peatlands (I. T. C. Wibisino personal communication 286 
10 Nov 2011; I49 personal communication 1 Dec 2011). Patronage influence in licensing has 287 
therefore resulted in a situation where most of the oil palm plantation land in Indonesia is 288 
controlled largely by only around ten (Chalil 2008) local and foreign conglomerate groups (P. 289 
F. Moore personal communication 27 Jun 2010).  290 
 291 
It is common among the top tiers of Indonesian plantation firms to have ‘functional directors’ 292 
appointed to perform ‘extra-economic functions’ (Gomez 2009), and ‘advisors’ who are 293 
elected on a retainer basis. Indonesia adopts a two-tier management structure, comprising a 294 
board of directors and a board of commissioners. Officially, the former manages and 295 
represents the company and the latter supervises the directors (Rajenthran 2002). However, in 296 
reality, interviewees report that members of the board of commissioners (and sometimes also 297 
board of directors) are typically retired senior bureaucrats (mantan) who could act as 298 
intermediaries with the state and perform ‘advisory and brokerage functions’ on behalf of the 299 
company when needed (M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar personal communication 30 Jun 2010; A. 300 
Tarigan personal communication 16 Jul 2010; R. Syaf personal communication 24 Jul 2010; 301 
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J. Arif, personal communication 4 Nov 2011; G. Z. Anshari personal communication 9 Nov 302 
2011). In other words, they are elected to the post by virtue of their connections.  303 
 304 
This is an important element in patronage politics (Johnston 2005), and especially common in 305 
the oil palm sector (M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar personal communication 30 Jun 2010; R. 306 
Syaf personal communication 24 Jul 2010; J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 2011; A. 307 
Rukmantara personal communication 14 Nov 2011). Foreign companies, especially 308 
Malaysian and Singaporean firms operating in Indonesia, have also been found to regularly 309 
engage in this type of patronage behaviour. Interviewees explained that these companies, 310 
familiar with the patronage culture back home, understood the necessity of these networks 311 
and had little qualms about adopting this patronage culture themselves.  312 
 313 
Such appointments also occur at the local level, especially with the advent of 314 
decentralization. Indonesia’s flawed decentralization policies in the late 1990s failed to 315 
anticipate the effect of internal regional autonomy reforms, which, among others, have also 316 
encouraged the ‘decentralization’ of patronage politics to the local level as well. 317 
Decentralization had led to widespread confusion on the ground about who has the authority 318 
to approve local land use redesignation and plantation development, or how recently 319 
devolved authorities are legally exercised (Mayer 2006). For example, the law states that 320 
‘local government has the authority to manage natural resources occurring in its jurisdiction 321 
and shall be responsible to secure environmental sustainability in accordance with laws and 322 
regulations’ (Richardson 2010). Before decentralization, evaluation of the Environmental 323 
Impact Analysis (Analisis Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan or AMDAL) was done at the 324 
ministerial level. With decentralization, the evaluation of AMDAL has been under the 325 
capacity of the local government (Widianarko 2009). Therefore, decentralization has 326 
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paralyzed the effectiveness of Environmental Act No. 23/1997, and its subordinate 327 
regulations (Widianarko 2009). Although the central government retains the power to decide 328 
‘policies on natural resources utilization’ (Article 7 of the Regional Autonomy Law No. 329 
22/1999), the management of it per se is ceded to the regions (Article 10) (Rajenthran 2002). 330 
 331 
In particular, Government Regulation No. 6/1999 granted district governments the authority 332 
to issue small-scale timber concession licenses (L. M. Syarif personal communication 24 Jun 333 
2010; Wiryono personal communication 8 Nov 2011) to co-operatives, individuals, or 334 
corporations owned by Indonesian citizens for areas of up to 100 hectares (Palmer and Engel 335 
2007) within conversion forests or production forests slated for reclassification to other uses, 336 
including into oil palm plantations (L. M. Syarif personal communication 24 Jun 2010). 337 
Following that, the National Deregulation Policy Package of 2003 granted greater authority 338 
to local governors, allowing them to issue permits for the conversion of forests to plantations 339 
of up to 1000 hectares (Richardson 2010). This was encouraged by fact that with 340 
decentralization, local governments were responsible for a large part of their own budgets. 341 
Issuing new plantation permits and licenses presented a quick and easy way to fill regional 342 
government coffers (Duncan 2007). Local administrations have taken advantage of this; for 343 
example research by Zakaria et al. (2007) in the regency of Seruyan in Central Kalimantan 344 
noted that ‘colours on the land use map of the regency quickly changed from green 345 
‘Production Forest’ to orange ‘HPK’ or land available for conversion into plantations’ soon 346 
after decentralization (Zakaria et al. 2007).  347 
 348 
However, central Forestry Law No. 41/1999 and its implementing instrument, Government 349 
Regulation 34/2002 on the Management, Exploitation and Use of Forest Areas, continue to 350 
retain competence for the central government in the granting of concession licenses (Tan 351 
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2004). This left the respective areas of authority of different agencies unclear (McCarthy and 352 
Zen 2010) which created a great deal of confusion, as various levels of government disagreed 353 
with the interpretations of the laws (White III 2007). Although the conversion of primary 354 
forests into plantations must theoretically be approved by the Ministry of Forestry, regional 355 
governments rarely comply with this regulation (Richardson 2010).  356 
 357 
For a host of local officials, the new decentralized laws and procedures presented 358 
opportunities to ‘cut in’ to a previously Jakarta-centered lucrative ‘industry’ of licensing rents 359 
(Lim and Stern 2003; Tan 2004; Palmer and Engel 2007; White III 2007; Hunt 2010). 360 
Therefore, with decentralization, the role of local police chiefs, local (district and regencies) 361 
governments, administrators and politicians became increasingly important. Indeed, an 362 
interviewee from Sime Darby described these local strongmen ‘like kings, who can make 363 
your life miserable if you do not have a good relationship with them’ (M45, M46, M47, M48 364 
personal communication 17 Jan 2012). Interviewees explained that companies began to elect 365 
as part of their staff local strongmen, their relatives (; M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar personal 366 
communication 30 Jun 2010; I. T. C. Wibisino personal communication 10 Nov 2011), 367 
retired three- or four-star Generals, police chiefs or relevant ministry staff. These individuals 368 
would be hired as managers, special ‘community relations officers’ (Hubungan Masyarakat 369 
or HuMas) (E. Peters personal communication 13 Apr 2010) or ‘government relations 370 
officers’ to cultivate healthy patronage links at the local level (E. Peters personal 371 
communication 13 Apr 2010; I. T. C. Wibisino personal communication 10 Nov 2011; A. 372 
Rukmantara personal communication 14 Nov 2011)
2
.  373 
 374 
                                                 
2
 For further evidence of these networks of relationships between plantation firms and governments at the 
central and local level, see(Varkkey 2012) 
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Therefore, opportunities for patronage politics exist at various central and local levels. As one 375 
interviewee observed, ‘Indonesia is dominated by big business, and the bureaucracy is so 376 
corrupted that it is easy’ (P. F. Moore personal communication 27 Jun 2010) for these well-377 
connected clients to take advantage of this. Oil palm plantation companies, both local and 378 
foreign, have indeed done so; using their network influence and resources to obtain the rights 379 
to large, secluded tracts of land that will not be easily subjected to administrative scrutiny, 380 
with little concern if this land is restricted due to peat or not (Suwarsono personal 381 
communication 24 Jun 2010; A. Tarigan personal communication, 16 Jul 2010; A. 382 
Rukmantara personal communication 14 Nov 2011), as the following section expounds. 383 
 384 
Patronage politics and the allocation of licenses for peatland use 385 
 386 
Forest policy in Indonesia is based on the Constitution of 1945 (Article 33), which mandates 387 
the state to manage Indonesia’s natural resources, ‘for the benefit of the people’ (Abdullah 388 
2002). In addition, Act No. 5/1990 and Act No. 41/1999 on Biodiversity Conservation are the 389 
main references for managing forest resources in Indonesia (Masripatin et al. 2009). These 390 
laws reflect the philosophy of forest management in Indonesia which accommodate the need 391 
to utilize forest resources optimally as well as to conserve forest resources to assure multiple 392 
benefits in a sustainable manner (Masripatin et al. 2009). To ensure this, the government of 393 
Indonesia fosters and controls local private sector and foreign investment licensing in 394 
forestlands (Rajenthran 2002). Indonesian forest land is divided into four major functional 395 
categories; Production Forest (Hutan Produksi) Convertible Forest (Hutan Konversi), 396 
Protection Forest (Hutan Lindung), Conservation Forest (Kawasan Konservasi). Convertible 397 
Production Forest (Hutan Produksi Konversi or HPK) can be converted to other non-forest 398 
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uses, like oil palm. The majority of the HPK is found in the lowlands of Indonesia, including 399 
peatlands (Masripatin et al. 2009).  400 
 401 
While the Forestry Ministry has the ability to redesignate forestland as HPK, the exceptional 402 
nature of peatlands and impacts of peatswamp forest fires justified special legislation 403 
restricting development on peatlands (G. Z. Anshari, personal communication, 9 November 404 
2011). Presidential Decree No. 32/1990, Indonesian Government Regulation No. 26/2008 405 
states that peat of more than 3 meters deep should automatically be designated as protected 406 
areas (PanEco Foundation 2008; Ministry of Forestry 2009). Also, the Regulation of the 407 
Ministry of Agriculture No. 14/2009 stipulates that if there is a concession in peatlands with 408 
an area of more than 30% of its total concession having a peat thickness of more than 3 409 
meters, then the entire concession should not be opened (Wibisino et al. 2011). Furthermore, 410 
there are spatial planning guidelines under the Ministry of Agriculture and National 411 
Development Planning Agency that identify areas of peat more than 76cm deep peat as 412 
unsuitable for conversion to agriculture (Ministry of Forestry 2009; BAPPENAS 2009). 413 
There is also a standing instruction through the Ministry of Agriculture’s Instruction to the 414 
Governors of Indonesia No. 301/TU.210/M/12/2001 (13 December 2007) stating that the 415 
issuing of new plantation concessions on peatlands are temporarily forbidden, pending further 416 
instructions. Essentially, this means that issuing of plantation concessions in peatlands across 417 
Indonesia is wholly forbidden (PanEco Foundation 2008). However, as of now, more than a 418 
quarter of all Indonesian oil palm plantations are on peat (Greenpeace 2007; Silvius and Kaat 419 
2010; Wicke et al. 2011; Kaat and Silvius 2011).  420 
 421 
The decision to release HPK from the forest estate is subject to ministerial approval based on 422 
proposals from industry (Masripatin et al. 2009). For forestry and agricultural matters, the 423 
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Ministry of Forestry processes the initial application of both local and foreign approvals 424 
(Rajenthran 2002). The licensing process of obtaining land for plantation purposes thus is a 425 
lengthy and complicated procedure, involving various levels of governance in Indonesia, 426 
allows for high-handed bureaucratic intervention (Rajenthran 2002) at both the central and 427 
local level (S. Lew and M7 personal communication 18 Mar 2010; S14 and S15 personal 428 
communication 19 May 2010). The procedure is outlined as follows: 429 
 430 
1) Obtain a technical recommendation for investment in plantation business from the 431 
Directorate General of Plantations (central level); 432 
2) If the investment is foreign, obtain a foreign investment approval from the Indonesian 433 
Capital Coordinating Board, and duly establish a company approved for foreign 434 
investment (central level); 435 
3) Obtain a recommendation from the relevant regional government institution stating 436 
that the intended area for plantation development is in accordance with the regional 437 
zoning plan determined by the regional government (district level); 438 
4) Obtain a location permit to commence land acquisition (central level); 439 
5) Conduct the land acquisition; 440 
6) Apply for Land Cultivation Title (Hak Guna Usaha) (central level); 441 
7) Conduct an AMDAL study, and obtain the AMDAL approval from the regional 442 
government (regional level); 443 
8) Prepare a business plan of the company; 444 
9) Obtain a plantation business permit (Izin Usaha Perkebunan or IUP) (regional level); 445 
10) Commence the seeding and planting of plantation plants (United Plantations 2008) 446 
 447 
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This 10-step procedure is often skipped or overlooked by well-connected companies, often 448 
resulting in parcels of fire-prone peatlands being illegally released to plantation companies. 449 
An important step in this process that is often skipped by well-connected companies is the 450 
AMDAL requirement (I18 personal communication 14 Jul 2010). The AMDAL process 451 
should be the step where land with peat is detected and licenses are denied. Indeed, the 452 
positive outcome for the AMDAL review process should be the main prerequisite for the 453 
minister or governor to issue a permit of environmental feasibility, which can be then used to 454 
obtain an IUP (Milieudefensie 2010a) (step 9 above). However, because these well-connected 455 
companies often gain ‘special’ approvals (J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 2011) to 456 
proceed with land opening before the AMDAL is carried out (Zakaria et al. 2007), peat is 457 
often inadvertently included in these parcels.  458 
 459 
For example, the NGO Borneo People’s Contact reported that five plantation companies in 460 
Kalimantan had engaged in patronage activities at both the local and higher levels of 461 
government to obtain permits (Jakarta Post 2011). Indonesia’s Duta Palma began operations 462 
in West Kalimantan without all four of Indonesia’s key land use and land use change permits 463 
as listed above, including the AMDAL. Locals were of the opinion that Duta Palma was able 464 
to operate with such impunity due to its strong military connections (Gilbert 2009). And 465 
Malaysia’s IOI Group (IOI) received ‘special approval’ from the Ministry of Forestry to open 466 
up parts of their concessions in West Kalimantan before the AMDAL process was completed 467 
(Milieudefensie 2010a).  468 
 469 
Singapore’s Wilmar recently admitted that it started land clearing on plantations (containing 470 
peat) in West Kalimantan before the approval of AMDAL, because of ‘special permission’ 471 
from the governor (Zakaria et al. 2007). Likewise, Singapore’s Golden Agri Resources 472 
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(GAR) also recently admitted that it conducted land clearing before AMDAL was completed 473 
on six of its concessions in Central Kalimantan. They obtained special ‘in-principle business 474 
permits’ from the governor and local officials to enable them to do so (Reksoprodjo 2010). 475 
One interviewee explained that GAR often obtains these special licenses in exchange for 476 
GAR’s contributions in funding election campaigns of local leaders (I49 personal 477 
communication 1 Dec 2011). Sometimes these corrupt patrons who give out these special 478 
allowances do get caught. For example, an East Kalimantan Mayor was found guilty for 479 
issuing permits not in accordance to procedure, for a project that would turn a one million 480 
hectare forest along the Indonesia-Malaysia border into oil palm plantations (Jakarta Post 481 
2006). However, these cases are a rarity.  482 
 483 
Table 1: Peat and oil palm in Indonesia, figures for 2008 484 
 Indonesia Hectares 
Land area 190,000,000 
Of which peat 26,500,000 
Of which degrading 12,500,000 
Of which licensed for conversion 5,000,000 
Of which converted to oil palm 2,000,000 
% of oil palm on peat 27% 
 485 
Source: Silvius and Kaat 2010; Suharto 2010; Kaat and Silvius 2011 486 
 487 
As a result, despite ample regulations restricting oil palm development on peatlands, up to 488 
25% of concessionaires deviate from this rule and plant on deep peat anyway (Silvius and 489 
Kaat 2010). Today, over a quarter of all oil palm concessions in Indonesia are located on peat 490 
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(see Table 1) (Greenpeace 2007; Silvius and Kaat 2010; Kaat and Silvius 2011; Wicke et al. 491 
2011), and over 50% of new plantations are planned in these peatlands areas (Greenpeace 492 
2007; Silvius and Kaat 2010). 493 
 494 
This situation is especially serious in Riau on Sumatra Island, where one-third of all oil palm 495 
concessions are situated on peat. It was reported in 2005 that in Riau, only 5 out of 36 496 
concessions were issued according to the above 10-step procedure (Harahap 2008). 497 
Furthermore, local governors in Riau collectively have plans to expand oil palm plantations 498 
by 3 million hectares. The 2007 draft of the new provincial land use plan shows that hundreds 499 
of thousands of hectares of peatlands have been designated for conversion, the majority of 500 
this consisting of large tracts of tropical peatlands, which was until recently forested areas 501 
(Greenpeace 2007). Many major plantation companies have been found to have obtained 502 
licenses for peatlands in Riau. For example, Indonesian companies Duta Mas, Astra Agro and 503 
Musim Mas were all found to have acquired land on peat. Duta Palma was found to hold 5 504 
concessions on very deep strata of peat ranging from 3.5 meters to 8 meters, with a total area 505 
of 55,000 hectares. Musim Mas also has a concession on deep peat in Riau, with an estimated 506 
area of 30,600 hectares, in some areas over 4 meters deep. Astra Agro has 2 concessions on 507 
peatlands in Riau, with an estimated total area of 20,000 hectares. Foreign companies are no 508 
exception, like Singapore’s GAR and Wilmar and Malaysia’s Kuala Lumpur Kepong (KLK) 509 
and Tabung Haji Plantations (THP). GAR has 6 concessions on peatlands in Riau, with an 510 
estimated total area of over 54,000 hectares. Wilmar has 3 concessions on peatlands in Riau, 511 
with an estimated total area of over 29,000 hectares (Greenpeace 2007). Indo Agri has a 512 
concession on peat in Riau, with an estimated total area of 8,500 hectares. 70% (19,432 513 
hectares) of PT Adei Plantation and Insdustry’s (a subsidiary of KLK) land in Riau is on 514 
peatsoil (Saharjo et al. 2003). And most of THP’s 150,000 hectares of allocated plantation 515 
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land in Riau is on peatsoil as well (M28 personal communication 14 Apr 2010). In the 516 
neighbouring province of Jambi, companies like Bakrie Sumatra Plantations (BSP), Sime 517 
Darby, Makin Group and GAR also operate on peatlands (Munadar et al. 2010). 518 
 519 
Peat areas in Borneo Island’s Kalimantan are quickly being converted into oil palm 520 
plantations as well due to illegal licensing (J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 2011). One 521 
interviewee reports that 400,000 hectares of peat in Kalimantan has already been illegally 522 
converted to plantations (M44 personal communication 5 Jan 2012). Malaysia’s IOI has five 523 
concessions on peat in West Kalimantan (with one consisting of 88% peat) (Milieudefensie 524 
2010b) and one  concession on peat in Central Kalimantan province, with an estimated area 525 
of 3,000 hectares on peatlands. The government-linked Malaysian conglomerate Sime Darby 526 
also has a concession on peat in Central Kalimantan province, with an estimated area of 527 
1,600 hectares (Greenpeace 2007). The Singaporean Wilmar has peatlands in four 528 
concessions in West Kalimantan and 12 in Central Kalimantan (Zakaria et al. 2007; 529 
Greenpeace 2007). In Central Kalimantan, Singapore’s GAR admitted that 1,880 hectares of 530 
its oil palm plantation developments were on peat, while  in West Kalimantan, this figure was 531 
1,330 hectares (Reksoprodjo 2010). Indonesia’s Musim Mas has four concessions on peat, 532 
and Astra Agro has 7 concessions on peatlands in Central Kalimantan (Greenpeace 2007).   533 
 534 
This is clearly at odds with many of these companies’ policies on the environment. For 535 
example, GAR’s Forest Conservation Policy claims to ensure a no-deforestation footprint and 536 
the conservation of high carbon stock forests in their operations (Reuters 2011), and includes 537 
pledges to stop any development on peat regardless of depth (Golden Agri-Resources Ltd 538 
2010). Wilmar’s sustainability commitments include not establishing plantations on high 539 
conservation value forests, primary forests or peatlands less than 3 meters deep (Greenpeace 540 
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2007; Zakaria et al. 2007; Richardson 2010). Sime Darby has also made public commitments 541 
not to develop on peat (M44 personal communication 5 Jan 2012), and IOI’s Corporate 542 
Social Responsibility statements clearly state that it does not develop on (any) peat 543 
(Milieudefensie 2010a). 544 
 545 
According to the previously discussed Indonesian law, all plantation land on peat is 546 
essentially illegal. This means that more than a quarter of all oil palm plantation land in 547 
Indonesia is illegal (M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar personal communication 30 Jun 2010; G. Z. 548 
Anshari personal communication 9 Nov 2011). However, even though by law, if existing or 549 
pending plantation licenses relate to deep peat, such licenses should be revoked under 550 
provisions of Presidential Decree 32/1990, Minister of Agriculture’s Instruction to the 551 
Governors of Indonesia No. 301/TU.210/M/12/2001, Government Regulation 26/2008 and 552 
Ministry of Agriculture Regulation 14/2009 (PanEco Foundation 2008; Wibisino et al. 2011), 553 
no plantations have had their licenses revoked on these ground as yet. It has been argued that 554 
one reason for this is because with decentralization, the power to rescind operating licenses 555 
has been granted to the local sectoral agencies like the Department of Industry and Trade 556 
(Dinas Perindustrian dan Perdagangan) and the Plantation Agency (Dinas Perkebunan), 557 
which do not have environmental or conservation responsibilities, but have a primary interest 558 
in supporting regional development (McCarthy and Zen 2010) and thus are easily swayed by 559 
clients on developmental grounds.   560 
 561 
Therefore, this paper argues that these well-connected plantation companies have been 562 
allowed to act with such impunity because of the patronage networks that they maintain with 563 
both the local and central governments, which has resulted in a lack of bureaucratic oversight. 564 
In these ways, the resource-rich Indonesian landscape has engendered a culture of ‘grab and 565 
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greed’ at both the central and district level (Brown 2006). For example, as discussed above, 566 
companies like GAR enjoy direct access to the President (M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar 567 
personal communication 30 Jun 2010) and also local governors (R. Syaf personal 568 
communication 24 Jul 2010) through their advisors and staff, and other companies like Sime 569 
Darby have powerful former Ministry staff in their employ (A. Tarigan personal 570 
communication 16 Jul 2010). As several interviewees explained, the influence of individuals 571 
are often instrumental in acquiring such land permits and licenses (M. T. Surya and A. 572 
Akhbar personal communication 30 Jun 2010; R. Syaf personal communication 24 Jul 2010; 573 
J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 2011), and also in ‘settling’ any disputes that might 574 
arise (M28 personal communication 14 Apr 2010; J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 575 
2011).  576 
 577 
Because of this, powerful plantation companies with good patronage ties have no reason to 578 
fear punishment, and the law will often be disregarded (Kurer 1996). This fosters a culture of 579 
impunity (Dauvergne 1995)  among well-connected elites in the sector. As a result, massive 580 
amounts of fire-prone peat are now exposed to conversion and development into plantations, 581 
further driving the haze. There have been recent governmental efforts to address this issue, 582 
the most notable being the adoption of the REDD programme. However, the influence of 583 
patronage has also limited the effectiveness of this programme, as the following section 584 
expounds. 585 
 586 
Patronage and peatlands regulation under REDD 587 
 588 
The latest and most high-profile development regarding peatlands regulation in Indonesia (I. 589 
Rowland personal communication 14 Apr 2011) is the REDD programme (Butler et al. 2009; 590 
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Richardson 2010). Under the programme, Norway pledged USD 1 billion to Indonesia in 591 
2009 (Butler et al. 2009) in exchange for a two-year moratorium on primary forests and 592 
peatlands (M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar personal communication 30 Jun 2010; R. Syaf 593 
personal communication 24 Jul 2010; J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 2011) in order 594 
to identify which parts of the Indonesian peatlands are safe for further development (L. M. 595 
Syarif personal communication 24 Jun 2010; B. Maitar personal communication 24 Jun 2010; 596 
R. Syaf personal communication 24 Jul 2010). As part of this agreement, the Indonesian 597 
government agreed to establish a degraded land database, providing the necessary 598 
information to identify areas of land acceptable for the establishment of economic activity, 599 
including oil palm plantations (World Growth 2011). After a delayed start (Rondonuwu 600 
2011), the moratorium commenced in May 2011 (Kuala Lumpur Kepong Berhad 2010) with 601 
Presidential Instruction No. 10/2011 (I49 personal communication 1 Dec 2011). 602 
 603 
However, the REDD scheme has many inherent weaknesses. It has been argued that the 604 
REDD moratorium was watered down due to inherent political and private interests 605 
(Simamora 2011; Rondonuwu 2011) bolstered by patronage networks (L. M. Syarif personal 606 
communication 24 Jun 2010; A. Tarigan personal communication 16 Jul 2010). For example, 607 
some interviewees note the irony that Agus Purnomo, who is rumoured to be closely 608 
associated with GAR (M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar personal communication 30 Jun 2010), is a 609 
central figure in REDD implementation in his capacity as the Indonesian Special Advisor to 610 
the Ministry of Environment and Head of the Secretariat of the National Council on Climate 611 
Change. Furthermore, illustrating the close relationship between government and industry, 612 
the President himself met personally with, and promised major players and the sector’s lobby 613 
group, the Indonesian Palm Oil Association (Gabungan Pengusaha Kelapa Sawit Indonesia 614 
or GAPKI, which boasts membership of 382 local and foreign commercial plantations), that 615 
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he would ensure that their interests would be accommodated through REDD (Simamora 616 
2011) prior to the start of the moratorium. One interviewee also stated that Joko Supriyono, a 617 
director at Astra Agro and also Secretary General of GAPKI was able to use his formidable 618 
influence with the government in getting a weaker moratorium passed (I48 personal 619 
communication 30 Nov 2011).   620 
 621 
As a result of all this, the government decided that as part of REDD, existing plantation 622 
investment projects (including those on peatlands) already approved by the Indonesian 623 
government in the past will not be affected by the moratorium (Kuala Lumpur Kepong 624 
Berhad 2010). Also, the moratorium was set for only two years, an extremely short timeframe 625 
in contrast with the long horizons of the oil palm plantation sector. This period of time has 626 
been argued by environmentalists that were interviewed as too short to bring about any 627 
significant improvement on the situation of peatlands in Indonesia (A. Tarigan personal 628 
communication 16 Jul 2010; J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 2011; I48 personal 629 
communication 28 Nov 2011). Furthermore, the Indonesian government has yet to clarify 630 
areas which are ‘sensitive’ and areas which are not, resulting in many ‘gray areas’ of 631 
ambiguous land (M55 personal communication 31 Jan 2012). Also, several interviewees 632 
argued that the reason for the delayed implementation of the moratorium was so that central 633 
and local governments could release a large amount of primary forests and peatlands to 634 
selected well-connected companies before the moratorium came into force (R. Syaf personal 635 
communication 24 Jul 2010; J. Arif personal communication 4 Nov 2011). Indeed, just before 636 
the moratorium was passed in May this year, interviewees reported that the Forestry Ministry 637 
had released several thousand of hectares of land in Central Kalimantan, including primary 638 
forests and peatlands, to the well-connected Duta Palma, GAR and Wilmar (J. Arif personal 639 
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communication 4 Nov 2011), which ensures their supply of land for at least the next two 640 
years while the moratorium is in force (M44 personal communication 5 Jan 2012).  641 
 642 
Under the REDD however, there is a proposed land-swap mechanism (I. T. C. Wibisino 643 
personal communication 10 Nov 2011), where the government will purportedly encourage 644 
holders of existing permits in primary forest areas or deep peat lands to swap degraded lands, 645 
and be compensated according to the size of the concession (Richardson 2010). This is good 646 
news for Indonesia’s peatlands. However, this mechanism is purely voluntary and no major 647 
plantation company has engaged in land swaps as yet (I. T. C. Wibisino personal 648 
communication 10 Nov 2011). It remains to be seen if this land swap mechanism would be 649 
considered as a cost-effective option for the companies involved. 650 
 651 
Furthermore, environmentalists operating in the field have discovered that district 652 
governments are already breaking the moratorium, due to patronage pressures from 653 
companies (L. M. Syarif personal communication 24 Jun 2010; R. Syaf personal 654 
communication 24 Jul 2010; I49 personal communication 1 Dec 2011). For example, one 655 
interviewee reports that the Governor of Aceh, Irwandi Yusof, was recently discovered to 656 
have continued to release licenses for peatlands in his regency despite the moratorium, and 657 
was brought to court by a local NGO on that account (I49 personal communication 1 Dec 658 
2011). Therefore, it remains to be seen if the REDD moratorium will be any more effective 659 
than previous regulations restricting the use of peatlands for plantation purposes. 660 
 661 
The contradiction here between governmental restrictions on land for plantations and 662 
governmental goals for continued expansion of the sector to reach a CPO output of 40 million 663 
tonnes per year by 2020 (M. T. Surya and A. Akhbar personal communication 30 Jun 2010; 664 
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I48 personal communication 30 Nov 2011) has not been lost on interviewees. As one 665 
interviewee explained, Joko Supriyono, a director at Astra Agro as mentioned above, in fact 666 
pointed this out to environmental NGOs to argue that in order for the government’s goals to 667 
be achieved, companies ‘had no choice’ but to continue establishing plantations on restricted 668 
areas (I48 personal communication 28 Nov 2011). Indeed, research has shown that strategies 669 
of commercial plantations to increase productivity have primarily focused on expansion of 670 
new land, rather than replanting or research and development (Suharto 2011). If expansion 671 
continues into these areas, especially on peatlands, the persistence of haze is extremely likely.  672 
 673 
Conclusion 674 
 675 
In short, this paper has shows how patronage politics within the Indonesian oil palm 676 
plantation sector has been very influential in the management, or mismanagement, of 677 
peatlands there. The booming oil palm industry in Indonesia poses a serious challenge to 678 
peatland conservation there because of the suitability of peat for oil palm growth. Hence, 679 
despite Indonesia having very clear policies limiting the use of peatsoil, its peatlands continue 680 
to be exploited to fuel the growth of this sector. The influence of patronage can be seen not 681 
only in the unscrupulous allocation of licenses for otherwise forbidden peatlands to well-682 
connected groups for conversion into oil palm plantations, but also in ensuring that any 683 
changes to licensing procedures remain firmly to the advantage of these powerful groups. 684 
This highlights a pertinent problem with peatland management in Indonesia. Policies that 685 
have been shaped for conservation purposes often do not stand up against economic interests, 686 
especially when both patrons and clients stand to gain economically. It also points towards 687 
potentially similar peatland management problems that may arise in other Southeast Asian 688 
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countries, which also have a high occurrence of peatsoil, and also have an entrenched culture 689 
of patron-client relations.   690 
 691 
Such relations result in a classic collective action or free-rider problem: what might be 692 
rational at the level of society makes less sense at the level of the individual, and creates 693 
disincentives for people to go along with changes in patronage systems that would benefit the 694 
majority (Larson and Soto, 2008). Hence, the haze can be seen as an example of the 695 
manifestation of free-rider attitudes within the sector; with patrons being more motivated by 696 
material gain rather than protecting the interests of the society, they are obligated to disregard 697 
the long-term interest of society for a haze-free atmosphere, focusing instead on helping their 698 
clients maximize profitability in the oil palm plantation sector (Larson and Soto 2008). 699 
 700 
This situation thus poses a difficult challenge in mitigating the transboundary haze problem 701 
in the region. This is because patronage networks are hard to dismantle as they serve the 702 
immediate needs and narrow interests of many elite individuals (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith 703 
2004). Even though this signals the scant likelihood of a more regulatory Indonesian state 704 
emerging, there are persistent social movements in Indonesia pushing for reform in the 705 
sector, spearheaded by NGOs like Sawit Watch, Wahana Lingkungan Hidup (WALHI), and 706 
Indonesia Corruption Watch, and international NGOs like Milieudefensie and Greenpeace. 707 
The lawsuit against the Governor of Aceh mentioned above is an example of civil society-708 
driven pressure for reform and a more regulatory state. Furthermore, with Indonesia signing 709 
the Jakarta Commitment in support of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2009 710 
(Suryabrata 2011), international pressure could be an effective tool that can be used by fellow 711 
endorsers of the Declaration, like Norway, to further strengthen the effectiveness of aid 712 
programmes like REDD and to avoid the manipulations of such programmes by political and 713 
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private interests. Without such efforts, the plight of the environment in the hands of well-714 
connected profit-motivated corporate plantations and their elite patrons is indeed dire. 715 
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